Page:Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (1st ed, 1833, vol III).djvu/349

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CH. XXXVII.]
EXECUTIVE—POWERS.
341

the exercise of power by a single hand.[1] Unity of plan, promptitude, activity, and decision, are indispensable to success; and these can scarcely exist, except when a single magistrate is entrusted exclusively with the power. Even the coupling of the authority of an executive council with him, in the exercise of such powers, enfeebles the system, divides the responsibility, and not unfrequently defeats every energetic measure. Timidity, indecision, obstinacy, and pride of opinion, must mingle in all such councils, and infuse a torpor and sluggishness, destructive of all military operations. Indeed, there would seem to be little reason to enforce the propriety of giving this power to the executive department, (whatever may be its actual organization,) since it is in exact coincidence with the provisions of our state constitutions; and therefore seems to be universally deemed safe, if not vital to the system.

§ 1486. Yet the clause did not wholly escape animadversion in the state conventions. The propriety of admitting the president to be commander-in-chief, so far as to give orders, and have a general superintendency, was admitted. But it was urged, that it would be dangerous to let him command in person without any restraint, as he might make a bad use of it. The consent of both houses of congress ought, therefore, to be required, before he should take the actual command.[2] The answer then given was, that though the president might, there was no necessity, that he should, take the command in person; and there was no probability, that he would do so, except in extraordinary emergencies, and when he was possessed
  1. The Federalist, No 74; 3 Elliot's Debates, 103.
  2. 2 Elliot's Debates, 365. See also 3 Elliot's Debates, 108.