from party motives, from a spirit of opposition, and even from motives of a more private nature, may reject a nomination absolutely unexceptionable. But such occurrences will be rare. The more common error, (if there shall be any) will be too great a facility to yield to the executive wishes, as a means of personal, or popular favour. A president will rarely want means, if he shall choose to use them, to induce some members of such a body to aid his nominations; since a correspondent influence may be fairly presumed to exist, to gratify such persons in other recommendations for office, and thus to make them indirectly the dispensers of local patronage. It will be, principally, with regard to high officers, such as ambassadors, judges, heads of departments, and other appointments of great public importance, that the senate will interpose to prevent an unsuitable choice. Their own dignity, and sense of character, their duty to their country, and their very tide to office will be materially dependent upon a firm discharge of their duty on such occasions.[1]
§ 1527. Perhaps the duties of the president, in the discharge of this most delicate and important duty of his office, were never better summed up, than in the following language of a distinguished commentator.[2]- ↑ The Federalist, No. 76, 77; 1 Kent's Comm. Lect. 13, p. 269; Rawle on Const. ch. 14, p. 102, &c.; 1 Tucker's Black. Comm. App. 340 to 343.—The whole reasoning of the Federalist, on this subject, is equally striking for its sound practical sense and its candour. I have freely used it in the foregoing summary. The Federalist, No. 70.
- ↑ Rawle on Const. ch. 14, p. 164.
