Page:Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (1st ed, 1833, vol III).djvu/390

§ 1529. The other part of the clause, while it leaves to the president the appointment to all offices, not otherwise provided for, enables congress to vest the

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grow populous and rich, yet it is not yet, I hope, to be dreaded. But ambition must come in, already. A senator of great influence will be naturally ambitious, and desirous of increasing his influence. Will he not be under a temptation to use his influence with the president, as well as his brother senators, to appoint persons to office in the several states, who will exert themselves in elections to get out his enemies or opposers, both in senate and house of representatives, and to get in his friends, perhaps his instruments? Suppose a senator, to aim at the treasury office, for himself, his brother, father, or son. Suppose him to aim at the president's chair, or vice-president's, at the next election—or at the office of war, foreign or domestic affairs, will he not naturally be tempted to make use of his whole patronage, his whole influence, in advising to appointments, both with president and senators, to get such persons nominated, as wall exert themselves in elections of president, vice-president, senators, and house of representatives, to increase his interests, and promote his views? In this point of view, I am very apprehensive, that this defect in our constitution will have an unhappy tendency to introduce corruption of the grossest kinds, both of ambition and avarice, into all our elections. And this will be the worst of poisons to our constitution; it will not only destroy the present form of government, but render it almost impossible to substitute in its place any free government, even a better limited monarchy, or any other, than a despotism, or a simple monarchy.
"'4. To avoid the evil under the last bead, it will be in danger of dividing the continent into two or three nations, a case that presents no prospect but of perpetual war.
'"5. This negative on appointments is in danger of involving the senate in reproach, obloquy, censure, and suspicion, without doing any good. Will the senate use their negative or not?—if not, why should they have it?—many will censure them for not using it—many will ridicule them, call them servile, &c., if they do use it. The very first instance of it will expose the senators to the resentment, not only of the disappointed candidate and all ids friends, but of the president and all his friends; and those will be most of the officers of government, through the nation.
"'6. We shall very soon have parties formed—a court and country party—and these parties will have names given them; one party in the house of representatives will support the president and his measures and ministers—the other will oppose them—a similar party will be in the senate—these parties will struggle with all their art, perhaps with intrigue, perhaps with corruption at every election to increase their own