which might vary the right to appoint in such cases. In one age the appointment might be most proper in the president; and in another age, in a department.
§ 1530. In the practical course of the government, there does not seem to have been any exact line drawn, who are, and who are not, to be deemed inferior officers in the sense of the constitution, whose appointment does not necessarily require the concurrence of the senate.[1] In many cases of appointments, congress have required the concurrence of the senate, where, perhaps, it might not be easy to say, that it was required by the constitution. The power of congress has been exerted- ↑ Rawle on Const. ch. 1 4, p. 163, 164; 1 Lloyd's Debates, 480 to 600; 2 Lloyd's Debates, 1 to 12; Sergeant on Const. ch. 29, (ch. 31.)—Whether the heads of departments are inferior officers in the sense of the constitution, was much discussed, in the debate on the organization of the department of foreign affairs, in 1789. The result of the debate seems to have been, that they were not. 1 Lloyd's Debates, 480 to 600; 2 Lloyd's Debates, 1 to 12; Sergeant on Const. ch. 29, (ch.31.)
should be suspected to proceed from partiality? And will not their fellow members have a degree of the same reluctance, lest it should be thought they acted from friendship to a member of their body? so that their friends and connections would stand a worse chance, in proportion to their real merit, than strangers. But if the president was left to select a council for himself, though he may be supposed to be actuated by the best motives—yet he would be surrounded by flatterers, who would assume the character of friends and patriots, though they had no attachment to the public good, no regard to the laws of their country, but influenced wholly by self-interest, would wish to extend the power of the executive, in order to increase their own; they would often advise him to dispense with laws, that should thwart their schemes, and in excuse plead, that it was done from necessity to promote the public good—they will use their own influence, induce the president to use his, to get laws repealed, or the constitution altered, to extend his powers and prerogatives, under pretext of advancing the public good, and gradually render the government a despotism. This seems to be according to the course of human affairs, and what may be expected from the nature of things. I think, that members of the legislature would be most likely duly to execute the laws, both in the executive and judiciary departments.'"[a 1]
- ↑ 2 Pitkin's Hist. p. 285 to 291.
