lation, giving a limited duration to office, recognizes the executive power of removal, as in full force.[1]
§ 1532. The other is a vastly important practical question; and, in an early stage of the government, underwent a most elaborate discussion.[2] The language of the constitution is, that the president "shall nominate, and, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, appoint," &c. The power to nominate does not naturally, or necessarily include the power to remove; and if the power to appoint does include it, then the latter belongs conjointly to the executive and the senate. In short, under such circumstances, the removal takes place in virtue of the new appointment, by mere operation of law. It results, and is not separable, from the appointment itself.
§ 1533. This was the doctrine maintained with great earnestness by the Federalist;[3] and it had a most material tendency to quiet the just alarms of the overwhelming influence, and arbitrary exercise of this prerogative of the executive, which might prove fatal to the personal independence, and freedom of opinion of public officers, as well as to the public liberties of the country. Indeed, it is utterly impossible not to feel, that, if this unlimited power of removal does exist, it may be made, in the hands of a bold and designing- ↑ In the debate in 1789 upon the bill for organizing the department for foreign affairs, (the department of state.) the very question was discussed; and the final vote seems to have expressed the sense of the legislature, that the power of removal by the executive could not be abridged by the legislature; at least, not in cases, where the power to appoint was not subject to legislative delegation. See 5 Marshall's Life of Washington, ch. 3. p. 196 to 200; 1 Lloyd's Debates, 351 to 366; id. 450, 480 to 600; 2 Lloyd's Debates, 1 to 12.
- ↑ 1 Lloyd's Debates, 351, 366, 450, 480 to 600; 2 Lloyd's Debates, 1 to 12; 5 Marshall's Life of Washington, ch. 3, p. 196 to 200.
- ↑ The Federalist, No. 77.
