Page:Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (1st ed, 1833, vol III).djvu/429

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CH. XXXVII.]
EXECUTIVE—INCIDENTAL POWERS.
421
§ 1566. The remaining section of the fourth article, declaring that the President, Vice-President, and all civil officers of the United States shall be liable to impeachment, has been already fully considered in another place. And thus is closed the examination of the rights, powers, and duties of the executive department. Unless my judgment has been unduly biased, I think it will be found impossible to hold from this part of the constitution a tribute of profound respect, if not of the liveliest admiration. All, that seems desirable in order to gratify the hopes, secure the reverence, and sustain the dignity of the nation, is, that it should always be occupied by a man of elevated talents, of ripe virtues, of incorruptible integrity, and of tried patriotism; one, who shall forget his own interests, and remember, that he represents not a party, but the whole nation; one, whose fame may be rested with posterity, not upon the false eulogies of favourites, but upon the solid merit of having preserved the glory, and enhanced the prosperity of the country.[1]

    to give any opinion, upon the ground stated in the text. 5 Marshall's Life of Washington, ch. 6, p. 433, 441.

  1. In consequence of President Jackson's Message, negativing the Bank of the United States, July 10, 1832, in which he advances the doctrine, that the decisions made by other departments of the government, including the Judiciary, and even by his predecessors in office in approving laws, are not obligatory on him; the question has been a good deal agitated by statesmen and constitutional lawyers. The following extract from a letter, written by Mr. Madison to Mr. C.J. Ingersoll, on 25th of June, 1831, contains reasoning on this subject, worthy of the judgment of that great man.
    "The charge of inconsistency between my objection to the constitutionality of such a bank, in 1791, and my assent, in 1817, turns to the question how far legislative precedents, expounding the constitution, ought to guide succeeding legislatures, and to overrule individual opinions.
    "Some obscurity has been thrown over the question, by confounding