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CONSTITUTION OF THE U. STATES.
[BOOK III.
petual fluctuations and changes, growing out of the diversity of judgment, as well as of local institutions, interests, and habits of thought.[1]
§ 1570. Two ends, then, of paramount importance, and fundamental to a free government, are proposed to be attained by the establishment of a national judiciary. The first is a due execution of the powers of the government; and the second is a uniformity in the interpretation and operation of those powers, and of the laws enacted in pursuance of them.. The power of interpreting the laws involves necessarily the function to ascertain, whether they are conformable to the constitution, or not; and if not so conformable, to declare them void and inoperative. As the constitution is the supreme law of the land, in a conflict between that and the laws, either of congress, or of the states, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to follow that only, which is of paramount obligation. This results from the very theory of a republican constitution of government; for otherwise the acts of the legislature and executive would in effect become supreme and uncontrollable, notwithstanding any prohibitions or limitations contained in the constitution; and usurpations of the most unequivocal and dangerous character might be assumed, without any remedy within the reach of the citizens.[2] The people would thus be at the mercy of their rulers,- ↑ Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. R. 304, 345 to 349; The Federalist, No. 22.
- ↑ The Federalist, No. 78, 80, 81,82; 1 Tuck. Black. Comm. App. 355 to 360; 3 Elliot's Deb. 134.—This subject is very elaborately discussed in the Federalist, No. 78, from which the following extract is made: "The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited constitution. By a limited constitution, I understand one, which contains certain specified exceptions to the legislative authority; such, for instance, as that it shall pass no bills of attainder, no
