Page:Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (1st ed, 1833, vol III).djvu/475

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CH. XXXVIII.]
JUDICIARY—TENURE OF OFFICE.
467

country during the reigns of arbitrary princes, and the struggles of arbitrary factions. They kept alive the memory and record of the constitution. They were the great security to private property, which might be said (when personal liberty had no existence,) to be as well guarded in France, as in any other country.[1]

§ 1603. The importance of a permanent tenure of office, to secure the independence, integrity, and impartiality of judges, was early understood in France. Louis the Eleventh, in 1467, made a memorable declaration, that the judges ought not to be deposed, or deprived of their offices, but for a forfeiture previously adjudged, and judicially declared by a competent tribunal. The same declaration was often confirmed by his successors; and after the first excesses of the French revolution were passed, the same principle obtained a public sanction. And it has now become incorporated, as a fundamental principle, into the present charter of France, that the judges appointed by the crown shall be irremovable.[2] Other European nations have followed the same example;[3] and it is highly probable, that as the principles of free governments prevail, the necessity of thus establishing the independence of the judiciary will be generally felt, and firmly provided for.[4]


  1. This is the very language of Mr. Burke in his Reflections on the French Revolution. See also De Lolme, B. 1, ch. 12, p. 159, note.
  2. Merlin's Repertoire, art. Juge, No. 3.
  3. 1 Kent's Comm. Lect. 14, p. 275.
  4. Dr. Paley's remarks on this subject arc not the least valuable of his excellent writings. "The next security for the impartial administration of justice, especially in decisions, to which government is a party, is the independency of the judges. As protection against every illegal attack upon the rights of the subject by the servants of the crown is to be sought for from these tribunals, the judges of the land become not unfrequently the arbitrators between the king and the people; on