Page:Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (1st ed, 1833, vol III).djvu/486

§ 1614. If passing from general reasoning, an appeal is made to the lessons of experience, there is every thing to convince us, that the judicial depart-

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that firm and steady hand his high functions require? No; if his nerves are of iron, they must tremble in so perilous a situation. In England the complete independence of the judiciary has been considered, and has been found the best and surest safeguard of true liberty, securing a government of known and uniform laws, acting alike upon every man. It has, however, been suggested by some of our newspaper politicians, perhaps from a higher source, that although this independent judiciary is very necessary in a monarchy to protect the people from the oppression of a court, yet that in our republican institution the same reasons for it do not exist; that it is indeed inconsistent with the nature of our government, that any part or branch of it should be independent of the people, from whom the power is derived. And, as the house of representatives come most frequently from this great source of power, they claim the best right of knowing and expressing its will; and of course the right of a controlling influence over the other branches. My doctrine is precisely the reverse of this.
"If I were called upon to declare, whether the independence of judges were more essentially important in a monarchy, or a republic, I should certainly say, in the latter, all governments require, in order to give them firmness, stability, and character, some permanent principle; some settled establishment. The want of this is the great deficiency in republican institutions; nothing can be relied upon; no faith can be given, either at home or abroad, to a people, whose systems, and operations, and policy, are constantly changing with popular opinion; if, however, the judiciary is stable and independent; if the rule of justice between men rests on permanent and known principles, it gives a security and character to a country, which is absolutely necessary in its intercourse with the world, and in its own internal concerns. This independence is further requisite, as a security from oppression. History demonstrates, from page to page, that tyranny and oppression have not been confined to despotisms, but have been freely exercised in republics, both ancient and modern; with this difference,—that in the latter, the oppression has sprung from the impulse of some sudden gust of passion or prejudice, while, in the former, it is systematically planned and pursued, as an ingredient and principle of the government; the people destroy not deliberately, and will return to reflection and justice, if passion is not kept alive and excited by artful intrigue; but, while the fit is on, their devastation and cruelty is more terrible and unbounded, than the most monstrous tyrant. It is for their own benefit, and to protect them from the violence of their own passions, that it is essential to have some firm, unshaken, independent, branch of government, able