constitution prohibited from doing a variety of things; some of which are incompatible with the interests of the Union; others with its peace and safety; others with the principles of good government. The imposition of duties on imported articles, the declaration of war, and the emission of paper money, are examples of each kind. No man of sense will believe, that such prohibitions would be scrupulously regarded, without some effectual power in the government to restrain, or correct the infractions of them.[1] The power must be either a direct negative on the state laws, or an authority in the national courts to overrule such, as shall manifestly be in contravention to the constitution. The latter course was thought by the convention to be preferable to the former; and it is, without question, by far the most acceptable to the states.[2]
§ 1636. The same reasoning applies with equal force to "cases arising under the laws of the United States." In fact, the necessity of uniformity in the interpretation of these laws would of itself settle every doubt, that could be raised on the subject. "Thirteen independent courts of final jurisdiction (says the Federalist) over the same causes is a- ↑ See 3 Elliot's Debates, 142.
- ↑ The Federalist, No. 80. See also id. No. 22; 2 Elliot's Debates, 389, 390.—The reasonableness of this extent of the judicial power is very much considered by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, in delivering the opinion of the court, in Cohens v. Virginia, (6 Wheat. R. 413 to 423,) from which some extracts will he made, in considering the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, in a future page.
In all these cases equitable circumstances may arise, the cognizance of which, as well as such, as were strictly legal, would belong to the federal judiciary, in virtue of this clause." 1 Tuck. Black. Comm. App. 418, 419. See also 2 Elliot's Debates, 380, 383, 390, 400, 418, 419.
