Page:Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (1st ed, 1833, vol III).djvu/514

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CONSTITUTION OF THE U. STATES.
[BOOK III.
§ 1639. It is observable, that the language is, that "the judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity," arising under the constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States.[1] What is to be understood by "cases in law and equity," in this clause? Plainly, cases at the common law, as contradistinguished from cases in equity, according to the known distinction in the jurisprudence of England, which our ancestors brought with them upon their emigration, and with which all the American states were familiarly acquainted.[2] Here, then, at least, the constitution of the United States appeals to, and adopts, the common law to the extent of making it a rule in the pursuit of remedial justice in the courts of the Union.[3] If the remedy must be in law, or in equity, according to the course of proceedings at the common law, in cases arising under the constitution, laws, and treaties, of the United States, it would seem irresistibly

    liberties of the states, since it would bring every thing within the vortex of the national jurisdiction. It was defended with great ability and conclusiveness of reasoning, as indispensable to the existence of the national government, and perfectly consistent with the safety and prerogatives of the states. See 2 Elliot's Debates, 380 to 427; 3 Elliot's Debates, 125, 128, 129, 133, 143; id. 280; 4 Elliot's Debates, (Martin's Letter,) 45.

  1. See 3 Elliot's Debates, 127, 128, 129, 130, 133, 141, 143, 154.
  2. See Robinson v. Campbell, 3 Wheat. R. 212, 221, 223.
  3. It is a curious fact, that while the adoption of the common law, as the basis of the national jurisprudence, has been, in later times, the subject of such deep political alarm with some statesmen, the non-existence of it, as such a basis, was originally pressed by some of the ablest opponents of the constitution, as a principal defect. Mr. George Mason of Virginia urged, that the want of a clause in the constitution, securing to the people the enjoyment of the common law, was a fatal defect. 2 American Museum, 534; ante, Vol. I. p. 275. Yet the whole argument in the celebrated Resolutions of Virginia of January, 1800, supposes, that the adoption of it would have been a most mischievous provision.