tinue it, or prevent the Union from repairing it, or the mails from travelling on it. But subject to these incidental rights, the right of territory and jurisdiction, civilly and criminally, would be complete and perfect in the state. The power of congress over the road would be limited to the mere right of passage and preservation. That of the state would be general, and embrace all other objects. Congress undoubtedly has power to purchase lands in a state for any public purposes, such as forts, arsenals, and dock-yards. So, they have a right to erect hospitals, custom-houses, and court-houses in a state. But no person ever imagined, that these places were thereby removed from the general jurisdiction of the state. On the contrary, they are universally understood for all other purposes, not inconsistent with the constitutional rights and uses of the Union, to be subject to state authority and rights.
§ 1141. The clause respecting cessions of territory for the seat of government, and for forts, arsenals, dock-yards, &c. has nothing to do with the point. But if it had, it is favourable to the power. That clause was necessary for the purpose of ousting the state jurisdiction in the specified case€, and for vesting an exclusive jurisdiction in the general government. No general or exclusive jurisdiction is either required, or would be useful in regard to post-roads. It would be inconvenient for congress to assemble in a place, where it had not exclusive jurisdiction. And an exclusive jurisdiction would seem indispensable over forts, arsenals, dock-yards, and other places of a like nature. But surely it will not be pretended, that congress could not erect a fort, or magazine, in a place within a state, unless the state should cede the territory. The only effect would be, that the jurisdiction in such a
