Page:Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (1st ed, 1833, vol III).djvu/571

zens of other states, both as to real and personal property. It would require an uncommon exercise of candour or credulity to affirm, that in cases of this sort all the state tribunals would be wholly without state prejudice, or state feelings; or, that they would be as earnest in resisting the encroachments of state authority upon the just rights, and interests of the citizens of other states, as a tribunal differently constituted, and wholly independent of state authority. And if justice should be as fairly and as firmly administered in the former, as in the latter, still the mischiefs would be most serious, if the public opinion did not indulge such a belief. Justice, in cases of this sort, should not only be above all reproach, but above all suspicion. The sources of state irritations and state jealousies are sufficiently numerous, without leaving open one so copious and constant, as the belief, or the dread of wrong in the administration of state justice.^[1] Besides; if the public confidence should continue to follow the state tribunals, (as in many cases it doubtless will,) the provision will become inert and harmless; for, as the party will have his election of the forum, he will not be inclined to desert the state courts, unless for some sound reason, founded either in the nature of his cause, or in the influence of state prejudices.^[2] On the other hand, there can be no real danger of injustice to the other side in the decisions of the national tribunals; because the cause must still be decided upon the true principles of the local law, and not by any foreign jurisprudence.^[3]

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1. See The Federalist, No. 80; 4 Dall. 474, 475, 471), per Mr. Chief Justice Jay; 1 Kent's Comm. Lect. 14, p. 276, (2 edit. p. 296); 3 Elliot's Debates, 141, 142, 144.
2. See Rawle on Const. ch. 31, p. 204; 3 Elliot's Deb. 381, 382.
3. 2 Elliot's Debates, 401, 402, 406.