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CONSTITUTION OF THE U. STATES.
[BOOK III.
be supposed to affect them; yet the clause would have proceeded no further, than to provide for such cases, unless some further restriction upon the powers of congress had been intended. The direction, that the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction in all cases, with such exceptions, as congress shall make, will be no restriction, unless the words are to be deemed exclusive of original jurisdiction.[1] And accordingly, the doctrine is firmly established, that the Supreme Court cannot constitutionally exercise any original jurisdiction, except in the enumerated cases. If congress should confer it, it would be a mere nullity.[2]
§ 1698. But although the Supreme Court cannot exercise original jurisdiction in any cases, except those specially enumerated, it is certainly competent for congress to vest in any inferior courts of the United States original jurisdiction of all other cases, not thus specially assigned to the Supreme Court; for there is nothing in the constitution, which excludes such inferior courts from the exercise of such original jurisdiction. Original jurisdiction, so far as the constitution gives a rule, is co-extensive with the judicial power; and except, so far as the constitution has made any distribution of it among the courts of the United States, it remains- ↑ Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, R. 174, 175; Wiscart v. Dauchy, 3 Dall. R. 321; Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. R. 392 to 395; id. 400, 401; Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. R. 820, 821.
- ↑ Id. ibid. 1 Kent Comm. Lect. 15, p. 294, 301, (2d edition, 314, 322;) Wiscart v. Dauchy, 3 Dall. R. 321.—Congress, by the judiciary act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, did confer on the Supreme Court the authority to issue writs of mandamus, in cases warranted by the principles and usages of law, to persons holding office under the authority of the United States. But the Supreme Court, in 1801, held the delegation of power to be a mere nullity. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, R. 137, 173 to 180.
