the question remains to this hour without any authoritative decision.[1]
§ 1700. Another question of a very different nature is, whether the Supreme Court can exercise appellate jurisdiction in the class of cases, of which original jurisdiction is delegated to it by the constitution; in other words, whether the original jurisdiction excludes the appellate; and so, e converso, the latter implies a negative of the former. It has been said, that the very distinction taken in the constitution, between original and appellate jurisdiction, presupposes, that where the one can be exercised, the other cannot. For example, since the original jurisdiction extends to cases, where a state is a party, this is the proper form, in which such cases are to be brought before the Supreme Court; and, therefore, a case, where a state is a party, cannot be brought before the court, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; for the affirmative here, as well as in the cases of original jurisdiction, includes a negative of the cases not enumerated.
§ 1701. If the correctness of this reasoning were admitted, it would establish no more, than that the Supreme Court could not exercise appellate jurisdiction in cases, where a state is a party. But it would by no means establish the doctrine, that the judicial power of the United States did not extend, in an appellate form, to such cases. The exercise of appellate jurisdiction is far from being limited, by the terms of the constitution, to the Supreme Court. There can be no- ↑ United States v. Ortega, 11 Wheat. R. 467; Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat R. 396, 397.
1 Wheat. R. 337, 338; Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. R. 820, 821; 1 Kent's Comm. Lect. 15, p. 294, 295, (2d edition, p. 314, 315;) Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. R. 395, 396, 397.
