CH. XXXVIII.]
JUDICIARY—JURISDICTION.
585
true meaning to the words, which define its extent. The counsel for the defendant in error urge, in opposition to this rule of construction, some dicta of the court, in the case of Marbury v. Madison.[1]
It is a maxim not to be disregarded, that general expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case, in which those expressions are used. If they go beyond the case, they may be respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit, when the very point is presented for decision. The reason of this maxim is obvious. The question actually before the court is investigated with care, and considered in its full extent. Other principles, which may serve to illustrate it, are considered in their relation to the case decided, but their possible bearing on all other cases is seldom completely investigated. In the case of Marbury v. Madison, the single question before the court, so far as that case can be applied to this, was, whether the legislature could give this court original jurisdiction in a case, in which the constitution had clearly not given it, and in which no doubt respecting the construction of the article could possibly be raised. The court decided, and we think very properly, that the legislature could not give original jurisdiction in such a case. But, in the reasoning of the court in support of this decision, some expressions are used, which go far beyond it. The counsel for Marbury had insisted on the unlimited discretion of the legislature in the apportionment of the judicial power; and it is against this argument, that the reasoning of the court is directed. They say, that, if such had been the intention of the article, "it would certainly have been useless to
- ↑ 1 Cranch, R. 174, 175, 176.
vol. iii.74
