Page:Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (1st ed, 1833, vol III).djvu/697

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page has been proofread, but needs to be validated.
CH. XLI.]
MODE OF AMENDMENTS.
689

human concerns.[1] In England the supreme power of the nation resides in parliament; and, in a legal sense, it is so omnipotent, that it has authority to change the whole structure of the constitution, without resort to any confirmation of the people. There is, indeed, little danger, that it will so do, as long as the people are fairly represented in it. But still it does, theoretically speaking, possess the power; and it has actually exercised it so far, as to change the succession to the crown, and mould to its will some portions of the internal structure of the constitution.[2]

§ 1825. Upon the subject of the national constitution, we may adopt without hesitation the language of a learned commentator. "Nor," says he,
can we too much applaud a constitution, which thus provides a safe and peaceable remedy for its own defects, as they may, from time to time, be discovered. A change of government in other countries is almost always attended with convulsions, which threaten its entire dis-

  1. The Federalist disposes of this article in the following brief, but decisive, manner: "That useful alterations will be suggested by experience, could not but be foreseen. It was requisite, therefore, that a mode for introducing them should be provided. The mode preferred by the convention seems to be stamped with every mark of propriety. It guards equally against that extreme facility, which would render the constitution too mutable; and that extreme difficulty, which might perpetuate its discovered faults. It, moreover, equally enables the general, and the state governments to originate the amendment of errors, as they may be pointed out by the experience on one side, or the other. The exception, in favour of the equality of suffrage in the senate, was probably meant as a palladium to the residuary sovereignty of the states, implied and secured by that principle of representation in one branch of the legislature; and was probably insisted on by the states particularly attached to that equality. The other exception must have been admitted on the same considerations, which produced the privilege defended by it." The Federalist, No. 43.
  2. See 1 Black. Comm. 90, 91, 146, 147, 151, 152, 160, 161, 162, 210 to 218.

vol. iii.87