theory, granting the truth of materialism. According to it, the knowledge of these objects, and that of the causal nexus between them, is the result of matter, and therefore is a dependent "effect" — the first effect in the perfect blank, which is to change that blank into what we call mind and its content. (The first, because by the theory the knowledge of causation, not being derived from experiences, must be contained in the first two phenomena given in consciousness.) But as an effect it is, of course, a phenomenon, and for a phenomenon to transcend phenomena, and attain the reality behind them, is, as before shown, impossible. Ontological knowledge is not possible to the mind when the mind is considered as a phenomenal effect. Knowledge of causation cannot be reached, then, on a materialistic theory, either through experiences or a single experience without intuitional or ontological knowledge. Only one way remains — that it should be reached through the activity of the Ego itself. The mind is a true cause, and gives knowledge of true causation. So, to prove mind an effect, materialism would have to postulate it as a cause. It is again suicidal.
To sum up: To prove a strict monism, materialism has to assume an original irresolvable dualism. To prove the mind a phenomenon of matter, it is obliged to assume a substance to give knowledge of that matter. To prove that it is an effect of matter, it is obliged to assume either an intuitional power of mind, or that mind is itself a cause, both equally destructive of materialism.
We conclude, therefore, that as a philosophical theory materialism has proved itself a complete felo-de-se. To afford itself a thinkable basis, it assumes things which thoroughly destroy the theory.
