preted by that theory, and for other interpretations also? In short, it must account not only for things as they are, but also as they seem to be. To stop at the first point is simply to beg the question. The best answer to any question is the one which enables you to understand and to account for all other possible answers.
Has Spinoza done this? It must be confessed that to many minds he seems to have done so. That we may attempt to see whether he has or not, let us state the problem again. It is to reconcile the Infinite, and the apparent finite, by the hypothesis of the Infinite alone ; to show the unity between the Absolute and the seeming relative by the hypothesis of the Absolute alone. A hard task ; but in reading the Ethics of Spinoza, we seem to find it accomplished, and the two elements, side by side, deduced from a common principle. To aid the mind to determine whether this accomplishment is only seeming, or is real, is our object now.
We shall endeavor to show that the solution of the problem by Spinoza, the reconciliation of the two elements, is brought about only by the assumption of contradictory elements in his premises, and the surreptitious bringing in of new ones as he proceeds. As we begin, we can do so with no better thought than that of Kant. A system which proceeds geometrically, like Spinoza's, must either draw synthetic or analytic conclusions, the analytic being conclusions which simply unfold what was already contained in the given conceptions, the synthetic being those which go beyond the given ones and add something to them. If the former, then, unless you would beg the whole question, you must show the validity and reality of your definitions; if the latter, you must show whence you obtain your material for going outside of the given conceptions. We shall endeavor to show the existence of contradictory elements in Spinoza's premises, not by a direct examination of them, but indirectly by drawing from them conclusions in plainest contradiction to those which he draws.
The object of the First Part of Spinoza's Ethics, "De Deo," is to demonstrate the existence of one substance infinite in infinite attributes, and to show the relation of this substance to finite things — viz., that they are but its accidents. That our exposition may be as clear as possible, we shall for the occasion adopt Spinoza's method, and, taking his axioms and definitions as our prem-
