first and foremost, the supreme organizing capacity of the Germans. The faults, on our side, which have retarded our victory, have been lack of ability in some of the higher commands, lack of co-ordination in the efforts to produce munitions, jobbery and family influence in Army appointments instead of the Napoleonic maxim of "la carrière ouverte aux talents" belief, on the part of our politicians, in expedients and clever words rather than a determined, concentrated vigorous effort of will. Germans who flatter themselves with hopes of England's decadence forget that we have exhibited exactly similar faults in all previous wars, and yet have been invariably victorious except against our kith and kin in America. There has been no failure of energy, courage and self-sacrifice on the part of the nation, but there has been failure on the part of its rulers. It is these same rulers, not the nation, whose past foreign policy I wish to call in question. And I do this in the hope that, after the war, England, together with France and America, may lead the world in a more just, a more humane, and a more pacific way of dealing with international problems.
It will be said in England that such criticisms as I have made of our Foreign Office are calculated to estrange the sympathy of Americans. I believe this to be an entire mistake. Both England and Germany, in presenting their case to the American public, have erred in claiming a complete sinlessness which is not given to mortals, and is not credible except to the eyes of self-love. Both have sinned, and any citizen of a neutral country will take this for granted before beginning to investigate the facts. No history of
