Anatolia, and Georgia could find there a market for its own products, and could also resume in full measure its function as a trade channel connecting East with West.
This general condition of peace would alone lead to a marked change in the economic position of Georgia.
It is also most desirable to remove the restrictions which hamper the traffic of steamers through the Dardanelles, and which are the result of the state of war still prevailing in that quarter. Then the postal communications between Georgia and the outside world must be made more prompt and secure. The present state of these communications is deplorable, which naturally prejudices all business relations with Europe.
Even when all these improvements, have been introduced, the overcoming of the financial crisis of the country will remain a very difficult problem. It is hardly conceivable that the crisis can be completely mastered without a foreign loan, which would cover the deficit of the Exchequer for one or two years and thus grant the State a breathing space, during which it can function without using the printing press. If this respite were wisely and energetically used, it should be sufficient to develop, so far the economic resources of Georgia that the finances could be placed on a stable foundation without requiring further assistance from outside.
In this respect attention would naturally be paid first to an increased exploitation of the national possessions, which involves the building of railways, such as a line to the coal fields of Tkvartscheli, and roads to open the great forests.
With all this is closely connected the encouragement of agriculture. The drainage of 50,000 hectares of swamps at Poti, the irrigation of 150,000 hectares in the east—for these improvements the preliminary work of survey has already been done—would suffice to render Georgia independent of outside help for its sustenance.
An improvement of agriculture may already be ex-
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