into accord? Is it possible for us only to establish between them a point of comparison?
"Certainly," cries M. Proudhon, "there is one, it is choice! The price which will result from this struggle between supply and demand, between utility and choice, will not be the expression of eternal justice."
M. Proudhon proceeds to develop this antithesis:
"In my character of free purchaser, I am the judge of what I want, judge of the convenience of the article, judge of the price I am willing to put upon it. On the other hand, in your quality of free producer, you are master of the means of production, and in consequence you have the power to reduce your cost of production." (Vol. I., p. 42.)
And as demand, or exchange-value, is identical with opinion, M. Proudhon is led to say:
"It is proved that it is the free will of man which gives rise to the opposition between use-value and exchange-value. How can we solve this opposition whilst maintaining free will? And how can we sacrifice this, without at least sacrificing man?" (Vol. I, p. 51.)
Thus then there is no result possible. There is a struggle between two incommensurable powers, so to speak, between utility and choice, between the free purchaser and the free producer.
Let us examine these things a little more closely.
Supply does not represent utility exclusively; demand does not represent choice exclusively. He who demands, does he not also offer a product of some kind, or the representative sign of all products, money; and in supplying this does he not, according to M. Proudhon, represent utility, or use-value?
On the other hand, he who offers, does he not also demand a product of some kind, or the representative
