less protect themselves from this loss, as, once the debased money was put in circulation, they had nothing to do but to order a general reminting of money at the old standard.
And, besides, if Philippe I. had really reasoned like M. Proudhon, Philippe would not have reasoned well "from the commercial point of view." Neither Philippe I. nor M. Proudhon show any evidence of mercantile genius when they imagine that it is possible to alter the value of gold as well as that of every other commodity, simply because that value is determined by the relation of supply and demand.
If King Philippe had ordered that a quarter of wheat should be henceforth called two quarters he would have been a swindler. He would have deceived all the fund-holders, all the people who had to receive a hundred quarters of wheat; he would have been the cause of all these people receiving, instead of a hundred quarters, only fifty. Suppose the king to owe a hundred quarters of wheat, he would have only really had to pay fifty. But in commerce a hundred such quarters would never be worth more than fifty. In changing the name we do not change the thing. The quantity of wheat, either in supply or demand, would not be diminished or increased by this simple change of name. Thus, the relation of supply to demand being precisely the same in spite of this change of name, the price of the wheat would undergo no real alteration. In speaking of the supply and demand of things we do not speak of the supply and demand of the name of things. Philippe I. was not the maker of gold or silver, as Proudhon says; he was the maker of the name of moneys. Make your French cashmeres pass for Asiatic cashmeres, and it is possible that you may deceive a buyer or two; but once the
