Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
KERRY, SECRETARY OF STATE, ET AL. v. DIN
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
No. 13–1402. Argued February 23, 2015—Decided June 15, 2015
Respondent Fauzia Din petitioned to have her husband, Kanishka Berashk, a resident citizen of Afghanistan and former civil servant in the Taliban regime, classified as an "immediate relative" entitled to priority immigration status. Din’s petition was approved, but Berashk’s visa application was ultimately denied. A consular officer informed Berashk that he was inadmissible under §1182(a)(3)(B), which excludes aliens who have engaged in "[t]errorist activities," but the officer provided no further information. Unable to obtain a more detailed explanation for Berashk’s visa denial, Din filed suit in Federal District Court, which dismissed her complaint. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that Din had a protected liberty interest in her marriage that entitled her to review of the denial of Berashk’s visa. It further held that the Government deprived her of that liberty interest without due process when it denied Berashk’s visa application without providing a more detailed explanation of its reasons.
Held: The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded.
718 F. 3d 856, vacated and remanded.
Justice Salia, joined by The Chief Justice and Justice Thomas, concluded that the Government did not deprive Din of any constitutional right entitling her to due process of law. Pp. 3–15.
(a) Under a historical understanding of the Due Process Clause, Din cannot possibly claim that the denial of Berashk’s visa application deprived her of life, liberty, or property. Pp. 4–5.
(b) Even accepting the textually unsupportable doctrine of implied fundamental rights, nothing in that line of cases establishes a free-floating and categorical liberty interest sufficient to trigger constitutional protection whenever a regulation touches upon any aspect of
