Breyer, J., dissenting
II
A
The more difficult question is the nature of the procedural protection required by the Constitution. After all, sometimes, as with the military draft, the law separates spouses with little individualized procedure. And sometimes, as with criminal convictions, the law provides procedure to one spouse but not to the other. Unlike criminal convictions, however, neither spouse here has received any procedural protection. Cf. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651 (1977) (availability of alternative procedures can satisfy due process). Compare Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U. S. 206, 213 (1953) (no due process protections for aliens outside United States), with Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U. S. 678, 693 (2001) (such protections are available for aliens inside United States). And, unlike the draft (justified by a classic military threat), the deprivation does not apply similarly to hundreds of thousands of American families. Cf. BiMetallic Investment Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of Colo., 239 U. S. 441, 445 (1915).
Rather, here, the Government makes individualized visa determinations through the application of a legal rule to particular facts. Individualized adjudication normally calls for the ordinary application of Due Process Clause procedures. Londoner v. City and County of Denver', 210 U. S. 373, 385–386 (1908). And those procedures normally include notice of an adverse action, an opportunity to present relevant proofs and arguments, before a neutral decisionmaker, and reasoned decisionmaking. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U. S. 507, 533 (2004) (plurality opinion); see also Friendly, Some Kind of a Hearing, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1267, 1278–1281 (1975). These procedural protections help to guarantee that government will not make a decision directly affecting an individual arbitrarily but will do so through the reasoned application of a rule of
