of all things is in its own nature the Highest Good.'
M. Thou hast most fairly convinced me.
P. Now, I told thee that the Highest Good and the Highest Happiness were one and the same thing.
M. That is so.
P. Well then, what are we to call this but God?
M. I cannot deny this, for I have already admitted it.
Then she said, 'Canst thou understand the matter any the more clearly if I mention yet another example to thee? Suppose there were two kinds of good that could not exist together, and yet were both good, would it not be quite evident that neither was the other? Perfect good, then, cannot be divided. How can it be full and yet lacking? Therefore we say that Perfect Happiness and God are but one form of Good, and that is the highest; these can never be divided. Are we not then bound to admit that the Highest Good and the Godhead are one?'
'Nothing is truer than this,' I said; 'we can find nothing better than God.'
'But I will wrap thee round,' said she, 'with yet another instance, so that thou mayest not find any way out; even as the wont of philosophers is to be ever seeking to show something new and unfamiliar, that they may therewith awaken the minds of their hearers.
'Did we not prove that happiness and the divine nature were one? He therefore who has happiness has both, and he that has both, is he not supremely blessed? Knowest thou not that we say a man is wise who
