is intended that the work shall be pushed forward until its junction with the main line of the system is accomplished. Russia, therefore, cannot well afford to ignore the consequences of her policy in the Far East, nor, at the same time, can she be expected to sacrifice, at the request of Japan, those great interests which she has been at such pains to foster. The position is, indeed, a striking example of the manner in which an imperious policy will create the taste, if not the necessity, for Imperialism.
The position of Korea in regard to the disputed questions is a hopeless one. Unfortunately, the government of Korea is powerless to prevent either the advance of Russia or the steady spread of Japanese influence. She possesses neither army nor navy which can be put to any practical use, and she is in that position in which a country is placed when unable to raise its voice upon its own behalf. The army numbers a few thousand men, who, in the last few years, have been trained to the use of European weapons. They are armed with the Gras, (obsolete pattern) Murata, Martini, and a variety of muzzle-loading smooth-bore rifles. Their shooting powers are most indifferent, and they lack besides the qualities of courage and discipline. There is no artillery, and the cavalry arm is confined to a few hundred men with no knowledge of horse-mastership, and with no idea of their weapons or their duties. At a moment of emergency the entire force of mounted and dismounted men would become utterly demoralised. There are numerous general officers, while, I believe, the navy is composed of twenty-three admirals and one iron-built coal lighter, until quite lately the property of a Japanese steamship company. Korea is the helpless, hapless sport of Japanese caprice or Russian lust; and it has been my aim to present an
