Opinion of the Court
clude any provision expressly abrogating governments’ sovereign immunity. Instead, it set forth a general definition for “States,” which encompassed Territories, possessions, and the District of Columbia. 52 Stat. 842. Then, in each provision where governmental entities were relevant, Congress specified the particular governmental entities to which that provision pertained. See, e.g., §17(1), id., at 851 (exempting from discharge debts “due as a tax levied by the United States, or any State, county, district, or municipality”); id., at 874 (providing priority status to “the United States or any State or any subdivision thereof”).
Section 101(27)’s definition of “governmental unit” has an undeniably broader reach than the statutory provisions that preceded it. Section 101(27)’s definition includes, for instance, foreign countries and instrumentalities, when such entities had generally been previously absent. And the expansive definition of “governmental unit” in §101(27) applies throughout the Bankruptcy Code. In addition, for those who find legislative history useful, the Senate and House Reports that accompanied the Code indicate that “governmental unit” was intended to be defined “in the broadest sense.” S. Rep. No. 95–989, p. 24 (1978); H. R. Rep. No. 95–595, p. 311 (1977). When Congress later added §106(a)’s abrogation provision, it was that comprehensive definition of governmental unit that Congress used to specify the scope of the abrogation’s sweep.
Thus, however Congress may have treated governmental entities in bankruptcy law prior to 1978, it had clearly altered its view about the scope of coverage relative to governments by the time it enacted §101(27) and §106(a). Those provisions unequivocally extend to all governments, for the reasons already discussed, and we decline to read ambiguity into the statute where none exists. *** We find that the First Circuit correctly concluded that the
