Page:Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Coughlin.pdf/2

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LAC DU FLAMBEAU BAND OF LAKE SUPERIOR CHIPPEWA INDIANS v. COUGHLIN

Syllabus

plausibly be read to preserve sovereign immunity, Congress has not unambiguously expressed the requisite intent. FAA v. Cooper, 566 U. S. 284, 290. But Congress need not use any particular words to pass this clear-statement test. Pp. 3–4.

(b) The Bankruptcy Code unequivocally abrogates the sovereign immunity of any and every government with the power to assert such immunity. Because federally recognized tribes unquestionably fit that description, the Code’s abrogation provision plainly applies to them as well. Pp. 4–16.

(1) Several features of the statute’s text and structure point the way. To start, the definition of “governmental unit” exudes comprehensiveness. It begins with a long list of governments, varying in location, nature, and size. It then proceeds to capture subdivisions and components of every government in that list. And it concludes with a broad catchall phrase, sweeping in “other foreign or domestic government[s].” §101(27). Moreover, the catchall phrase’s pairing of extremes—i.e., “foreign or domestic”—appearing at the end of an extensive list unambiguously indicates Congress’s intent to cover all governments in §101(27)’s definition. The abrogation provision in §106(a) in turn applies to every “governmental unit” in §101(27). It does not cherry-pick certain types of governments from that capacious list. Pp. 4–6.

(2) Other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code reinforce §106(a) and §101(27)’s plain text. To facilitate an “orderly and centralized” debt-resolution process, 1 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶1.01 (16th ed. 2023), the Code includes a number of requirements, like the automatic stay provision, that generally apply to all creditors. These basic requirements can be enforced against all kinds of creditors, whether the creditor is a governmental unit or not. At the same time, the Code contains limited exceptions to avoid impeding the functioning of governmental entities when they act as creditors. See, e.g., §362(b)(4). Reading the statute to carve out certain governments from the definition of “governmental unit”—as petitioners would have the Court do—risks upending the policy choices that the Code embodies. And there is no indication that Congress meant to categorically exclude certain governments from these provisions’ enforcement mechanisms and exceptions. Pp. 6–8.

(3) Federally recognized tribes are indisputably governments. They exercise uniquely governmental functions, and both Congress and this Court have repeatedly characterized them as governments. Accordingly, because the Bankruptcy Code unequivocally abrogates the sovereign immunity of all governments, and tribes undoubtedly count as governments, the Code unmistakably abrogates tribal sovereign immunity. Pp. 8–9.