40
Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee
Cite as 351 Ark. 31 (2002)
Cite as 351 Ark. 31 (2002)
[351
ent or by the circumstances (8) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer; the supreme court recognizes the superior perspective of the trial judge in weighing the applicable factors and will not set aside a trial court's fee award absent an abuse of discretion.
- ATTORNEY & CLIENT—ATTORNEY'S FEES—PERCENTAGE FEE REJECTED.—Because the economic benefit in this case did not lend itself to a firm figure and because the fee award must be paid by the government, either state or local, from tax revenues, the supreme court rejected a percentage fee; furthermore, the supreme court has never expressly adopted a multiplier against hours worked as a means for arriving at appropriate fees and declined to do so in this case.
- ATTORNEY & CLIENT—ATTORNEY'S FEES—TRIAL COURT ABUSED DISCRETION IN BASING AWARD ON PERCENTAGE OF $130 MILLION & USE OF MULTIPLIER.—The supreme court concluded that attorney's fees based on hours worked at an hourly rate of $150 was appropriate in this case; the novelty and difficulty of the case, the results obtained, the hours worked, the expertise of counsel, and the effect on other legal work of counsel, all militated in favor of an attorney's fee; nevertheless, the supreme court could not justify an award based on a percentage applied against $130 million or the use of a multiplier to enhance the fee; the supreme court held that, in doing so, the trial court abused its discretion.
- ATTORNEY & CLIENT—ATTORNEY'S FEES—AWARD MODIFIED.—The supreme court modified the trial court's attorney's fee award to an amount based on total hours worked, multiplied by the hourly rate of $150 per hour; the supreme court further modified the trial court's order and award costs in an amount that was supported by appellants' affidavit.
- SCHOOLS & SCHOOL DISTRICTS—CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITY—MANDATE STAYED.—Because the supreme court held that the current school-funding system was unconstitutional, Arkansas schools were presently operating under a constitutional infirmity; because the supreme court was strongly of the belief that the General Assembly and Department of Education should have time to correct this constitutional disability in public school funding and time to chart a new course for public education in Arkansas, the supreme court stayed the issuance of its mandate in the case until January 1, 2004, to give the General Assembly an opportunity to
