Page:Language and the Study of Language.djvu/143

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III.]
FROM A SINGLE ROOT.
121

by imposition of hands; to impound stray cattle; an imposing-stone; all his disposable forces; disposed to sleep; an amiable disposition; the prima donna is indisposed; troops disposed in three lines; God disposes; a worthy opponent; the house opposite; member of the opposition; divine interposition; he proposed to her; fifth proposition, first book; propounded for admission; locked in sweet repose; to repose confidence; what do you purpose? he did it on purpose; an effect supposes a cause; at least, I suppose so; a supposititious heir; and so on. Here is but a selection from among the multitude of expressions for heterogeneous conceptions which have grown out of the sign for the simple idea of 'putting' or 'placing;' but, though a striking, they are not an exceptional instance of the manner in which linguistic usage deals with all the material of language. As new experiences are met with, new deductions drawn, new opinions formed, new mental combinations made, new products brought forth, new existences discovered, language finds no difficulty in enlarging itself to represent them. The material which lies most conveniently at hand, even if it be not very near, is seized and applied to the purpose: that which was general is individualized; that which was individual is generalized; the concrete becomes the abstract; every variety of metaphor, of elliptical and pregnant expression, is resorted to, and, however bold and even startling at first, sinks by degrees to the level of ordinary prosaic appellation; and delicate shades of meaning are distinguished by the gradual separation of words at first equivalent. The multiplicity of these changes, and the variety of their results, our examples have been wholly inadequate to set forth with any fulness or completeness; only enough has been said to bring to light the leading facts and principles, to show what a fertile power of modification and adaptation is inherent in our speech, and that, in seeking and finding names for individual objects of conception, it is restrained within no narrow limits of action.

It must not fail to be observed that these processes of word-making, of names-giving, in all their variety, are not, in the fullest sense, consciously performed; that is to say, they are not, for the most part, premeditated and reflective,