pressed by thoughtful writers, that Lev. xviii. is part of the moral law and unchangeable, and that the words "Thou shalt not approach any one near of kin," &c. do furnish a general principle, including cases not actually expressed in the letter of Leviticus. One case, at least, not so expressed, must be included, since marriage with the daughter is not prohibited, while marriage with the mother is. Even the better heathen detested the incest with the mother. Yet God saw good to lay down the one and omit the other. And it is as reasonable an account as any other, of this omission, to suppose that He willed that it should be omitted, in order that we might not think that the whole range of forbidden relations was contained in those which are expressly, and in the letter, laid down. It can, neither, then be said that cases are omitted, because they are forbidden by nature itself, since cases most abhorrent to nature are included; nor, since purity is the same in both sexes, can any ground be alleged, without destroying that fundamental law, why marriage with a wife's sister should be lawful, since marriage with a husband's brother is not, or why an uncle may marry his niece, since an aunt may not marry her nephew. In this case the marriage which human passion is most likely to court, is forbidden by parity of reason only; that which it would rarely wish for, is expressly forbidden. We cannot tell the reasons why one was expressly named; but it would be a very narrow Pharisaic interpretation of Holy Scripture which would so insist upon the letter, as to conceive every thing, not in so many words forbidden in the letter, to be permitted, although equivalent to that which is forbidden. It is a sort of interpretation professedly borrowed from the Jews, [1] and resting upon their authority, yet more like the argument of a Jew with which
- ↑ Card. Caietan, from whom this principle is adopted (Evidence, No. 1010, 11, 52), is in many respects a very unsatisfactory Commentator.
