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contribution to make to the scientific project as a whole—I argue, that is, that there are issues with which the scientific project ought to be concerned that are not precisely scientific issues, and that philosophers are in a good position to tackle those issues.

In offering this account of the structure of science, I also give a novel way of understanding what it means to say that the scientific project is "unified." This is not merely an abstract point, but has real consequence for what will and will not count as a legitimate scientific theory: as we saw, one of the criticisms Maxwell offers is that scientists reject what he considers perfectly good theories on the basis of disunity. Is this true? In what sense is the unity of science an important guide to scientific theory, and how should we evaluate the relative unity of different theories? Does the unity of science conflict with the obvious methodological division of labor across the different branches of science? In addressing these questions, I hope to set the stage for a more fruitful examination of climate science's place in the scientific project overall.

Chapters Two and Three taken together are primarily a contribution to the foundations of complex-systems theory. Building on the account of science from Chapter One, I argue that the traditional bifurcation of science into physical and social sciences is, at least sometimes, misleading. I suggest that we should also see some scientific problems in terms of a distinction that cuts across the physical/social science division: the distinction between complex-systems sciences and simple-systems sciences. After reviewing some of the attempts to define "complexity" in the (relatively nascent) field of complex-systems theory (and arguing that none of the attempts fully succeeds in capturing the relevant notion), I use the machinery assembled in Chapter One to construct a novel account of complexity that, I argue, unifies a few of the most plausible definitions in the literature. This concept, which I will call dynamical complexity gives