—66—
By the end of August 1931, therefore, Sino-Japanese relations over Manchuria were severely strained in consequence of the many controversies and incidents described in this chapter. The claim that there were 300 cases outstanding between the two countries and that peaceful methods for settling each of them had been progressively exhausted by one of the parties cannot be substantiated. These so-called "cases" were rather situations arising out of broader issues, which were rooted in fundamentally irreconcilable policies. Each side accuses the other of having violated, unilaterally interpreted, or ignored the stipulations of the Sino-Japanese agreements. Each side had legitimate grievances against the other.
The account here given of the efforts made by one side or the other to secure a settlement of these questions at issue between them shows that some efforts were being made to dispose of these questions by the normal procedure of diplomatic negotiation and peaceful means, and these means had not yet been exhausted. But the long delays put a severe strain on the patience of the Japanese. Army circles in particular were insisting on the immediate settlement of the Nakamura case and demanded satisfactory reparation. The Imperial Ex-Soldiers' Association, amongst others, was instrumental in rousing public opinion.
In the course of September, public sentiment regarding the Chinese questions, with the Nakamura case as the focal point, became very strong. Time and again the opinion was expressed that the policy of leaving so many issues in Manchuria unsettled had caused the Chinese authorities to make light of Japan. Settlement of all pending issues, if necessary by force, became a popular slogan. Reference was freely made in the Press to a decision to resort to anned force, to conferences between the Ministry of War, the General Staff and other authorities for the discussion of a plan with this object, to definite instructions regarding the execution, in case of necessity, of that plan to the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army and to Colonel Doihara, Resident Officer at Mukden, who had been summoned to Tokyo early in September and who was quoted by the Press as the advocate of a solution of all pending issues, if necessary by force and as soon as possible. The reports of the Press regarding the sentiments expressed by these circles and some other groups point to a growing and dangerous tension.
Chapter IV.
NARRATIVE OF EVENTS IN MANCHURIA ON AND SUBSEQUENT TO SEPTEMBER 18th, 1931.
Situation immediately preceding the outbreak.
(See Map No.5[1])In the preceding chapter, the growing tension between the Japanese and Chinese interests in Manchuria was discussed and its effect on the attitudes of the military forces of the two nations described. Certain internal, economic and political factors had undoubtedly for some time been preparing the Japanese people for a resumption of the "positive policy" in Manchuria. The dissatisfaction of the army; the financial policy of the Government; the appearance of a new political force emanating from the army, the country districts and the nationalist youth, which expressed dissatisfaction with all political parties, which despised the compromise methods of Western civilisation and relied on the virtues of Old Japan and which included in its condemnation the self-seeking methods whether of financiers or politicians; the fall in commodity prices,
- ↑ Note by the Secretariat: All maps are to be found in the pocket of the Cover.
