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to initiate a retreat of the Chinese troops from their entrenched position. The armoured-car corps also changed its position. A shade of resistance led the Japanese to reinforce their strength by more armoured trains, infantry trains, and artillery. They also repeatedly threw bombs on Chinchow, but news of the improved situation at Tientsin soon deprived the expedition of its original objective and, on November 29th, to the great surprise of the Chinese, the Japanese forces were withdrawn to Hsinmin.
Another consequence of the earlier disturbances at Tientsin was that the former Emperor, who had been living in the Japanese Concession there, sought a safer refuge at Port Arthur on November 13th, after a talk with Colonel Doihara.
The occupation of Chinchow.The districts evacuated by the Japanese were re-occupied by the Chinese troops, and this fact was widely advertised. Chinese morale was slightly raised; and the activities of irregular forces and bandits increased. Profiting by the winter season, they crossed the frozen Liao River at many points and raided the country around Mukden. The Japanese military authorities realised that, even to maintain their existing positions, reinforcements would be necessary, and with these reinforcements they hoped to be able to get rid of the menace of the Chinese concentration at Chinchow.
Japanese reservation when accepting the resolution of the Council on December 10th.Meanwhile, the situation in Manchuria was a subject of further discussion in Geneva. When accepting the resolution on December 10th, the Japanese delegate stated that his acceptance "was based on the understanding that this paragraph (No. 2) was not intended to preclude the Japanese forces from taking such action as might be necessary 'to provide directly for the protection of the lives and property of Japanese subjects against the activity of bandits and lawless elements rampant in various parts of Manchuria'. Such action was admittedly 'an exceptional measure called for by the special situation prevailing in Manchuria', and its necessity would end when normal conditions should be restored there". To that the Chinese representative replied "that the injunction to the parties not to aggravate the situation should not be violated under the pretext of the existence of lawlessness caused by the state of affairs in Manchuria", and several Council members taking part in the discussion admitted that "circumstances might arise there causing danger to Japanese lives and property and in such an emergency it might be inevitable that Japanese forces in the neighbourhood should take action". When this matter has been referred to by Japanese officers who have given evidence before the Commission, it has been usually asserted that the resolution of December 10th "gave Japan the right to maintain her troops" in Manchuria, or made the Japanese Army responsible for the suppression of banditry there. In describing the subsequent operations, they assert that, while executing this right against the bandit forces near the Liao River, they incidentally came in conflict with the remaining Chinese forces near Chinchow, which were in consequence withdrawn within the Great Wall. The fact remains that, having made their reservation at Geneva, the Japanese continued to deal with the situation in Manchuria according to their plans.
Arrival of reinforcements.
(See Map No. 8.)The 2nd Division, with the exception of its garrison at Tsitsihar, was concentrated west of Mukden. Reinforcements soon began to arrive; the 4th Brigade of the 8th Division[1] between December 10th and 15th. On December 27th, Imperial sanction was obtained for the despatch of the Staff of the 20th Division and another brigade from Korea. Changchun and Kirin were for the time being only protected by Independent Railway Guards.
- ↑ All the statements here given concerning numbers of units and strength of the Japanese forces are based on official Japanese information.
