Ministers ought to be chosen in the Assembly, ought to lead
the Assembly, and to be controlled by it; and then there
would be no motive to fear them and to restrict their action.
That was an idea not to be learnt from Montesquieu,
and generally repudiated by theorists of the separation of
powers. It was familiar to Mirabeau from his experience
of England, where, in 1784, he had seen the country
come to the support of the king against the parliament.
Thence he gathered the conception of a patriot king, of a
king the true delegate and mandatory of the nation, in
fact of an incipient Emperor. If his schemes had come to
anything, it is likely that his democratic monarch might
have become as dangerous as any arbitrary potentate could
be, and that his administration would have proved as great an obstacle to parliamentary government as French administration has always been since Napoleon. But his purpose
at the time was sincerely politic and legitimate, and he
undertook alone the defence of constitutional principles.
During the month of September Mirabeau raised the
question of a parliamentary Ministry, both in the press
and in the Assembly. He prepared a list of eminent men for the several offices, assigning to himself a seat in the Cabinet without a portfolio. It was a plan to make him and
Talleyrand masters of the Government. The Ministers of
the day did not trust him, and had no wish to make way
for him, and when, on November 6, he proposed that
Ministers be heard in the National Assembly, the Arch-bishop of Bordeaux instigated Montlosier and Lanjuinais
to oppose him. Both were men of high character, and
both had some attainments; and in their aversion for him,
and for his evident self-seeking, they carried a motion forbidding deputies to take office. By this vote, of November 7,
which permanently excluded Mirabeau from the councils
of the king, the executive was deprived of authority. It is
one of the decisive acts of the Constituent Assembly, for
it ruined the constitutional monarchy.
Mirabeau was compelled to rely on a dissolution as the only prospect of better things. He knew that the vote was due as much to his own bad name as to a deliberate