�This Page Declassified lAW EO12958 USAF. This process of transfer was ?nally completed in the summer of 1949. Afthough later [t was found necessary to amend and revise the National Security Act of 1947, and despite the fact that disagree- ments arose between the services over their specific roles and missions under unifies. tmn, this leg?slatmn marked a turning pmnt in the legislative history of the Air Force. Placed on an equal basis w?th the Army and Navy, the Air Force could now irame its own legsslat:re program and plead its own case before Congress--and it could submit its own budgetary estimates and requests instead of having these treated as an ad- junct of the Army budget. The Air Force was also in a much better position to secure leges]arran framed to meet its own particu- lar needs and to press the case for the bmld-up of strategic air power which had become a particularly urgent concern of the A?r Force with the development of atomic weapons and the rising tide of Com- mumst aggression. The Army and Air Force Authorization Act of 1949 and the A?r Force Organization Act of 1951 also represented important steps m the development of the US/iF. The authorization act created a legal frame- work for the A?r Force in regard to its com- position, its strength in m?litary personnel, its procurement authority, research and de- velopment authority, and certain authority ?n regard to the expenchture of appropri- ated funds. This act placed the USAF on a firm legal basis in regard to x?s operations. The orgamzation act was important m that it provided a statutory basis for the internal organizatmn of the USAF. Th?s legislation completed the process of creating a separate air arm with a self-sulTiment orgamzational structure based on a sound legal founda- tion. Despite progress made in the organization of a separate and coordinate air arm, ap- propriations ?or the USAF felI to a low level after Wortd War II, and in 1949 an administration sponsored economy drive stopped the program to build up a 70-group Air Force and brought about a reduction of the USAF to 48 groups. However, the Korean crisis of 1950 changed the trend of legislation, and by 1951, appropriations for increasing the strength of the Air Force were approaching World War II leve?s. The legislation enacted by Congress to encour- age aircraft production so as to meet the needs of the expanding USAF and to ?rn- plement military aid to those countries par- tlcipating in the Mutual Defense Assistance Program was reminiscent of legislation en- acted in World War II to expedite produc- tion and make sufftment aircraft and other matertel available to supply the wartime needs of the AAF and send lend-lease equipment to Allied and friendly powers. The pohcy of containing Communist ex- pansion by crestraft a world-wide system of a?r bases ?n friendly countries, and the rec- ognition that the atomic bomb delivered by air power was the major strategic weapon upon which the United States could rely a? a detezrent to Commumst attack, led Congress to a new concept of the vital im- portance of air supremacy and of the major role of the A/r Force in our military estab- hshment. Th?s trend in the legislative policy of Congress is illustrated by the magnitude of the authorizations and appropriations made by Congress for the Air Force in 1950 and 1951. In conclusion it is evident that the de- velopment of the USAF and the crestran of American air power sufflmently strong to meet global defense reqmrements were and gre, in the last ?nalysis, dependent on the will and action of the United States Con- gress. The success of the USAF in gaining and maintaining air supremacy for the preservation of world peace, and for vic- tory in the event of war, is in a very large measure dependent on long and careful legislative planning and liaison work by ?he USAF in order to keep Congress advised as to i?s immediate and long-range needs. THIS PAGE Declassified lAW EO12958
