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They perfectly know how much their grievances would be regarded, if they had no other method of engaging attention, than by complaining. Those who rule, are extremely apt to think well of the constructions made by themselves in support of their own power. These are frequently erroneous, and pernicious to those they govern. Dry remonstrances, to shew that such constructions are wrong and oppressive, carry very little weight with them, in the opinion of persons who gratify their own inclinations in making these constructions. They cannot understand the reasoning that opposes their power and desires. But let it be made their interest to understand such reasoning----and a wonderful light is instantly thrown upon the matter; and then, rejected remonstrances become as clear as [1]“proofs of holy writ.”
The three most important articles that our assemblies, or any legislatures can provide for, are, First---the defence of the society: Secondly---the administration of justice: And thirdly---the support of civil government.
Nothing can properly regulate the expence of making provision for these occasions, but the necessities of the society; its abilities; the conveniency of the modes of levying money in it; the manner in which the laws have been executed; and the conduct of the officers of government: All which are circumstances, that cannot possibly be properly known, but by the society itself; or if they should be known, will not probably be properly considered but by that society.
If money be raised upon us by others, without our consent, for our “defence,” those who are the judges in levying it, must also be the judges in applying it. Of consequence the money said to be taken from us for our defence, may be employed to our injury. We may be chained in by a line of fortifications---obliged to pay for the building and maintaining them----and be told, that they are for our defence. With what face can we dispute the fact, after having granted that those who apply the money, had a right to levy it? For surely, it is much easier for their wisdom to understand how to apply it in the best manner, than how to levy it in the best manner. Besides, the right of levying is of infinitely more consequence, than that of applying. The people of England, who would burst out into fury, if the crown should attempt to levy money by its own authority, have always assigned to the crown the application of money.
As to “the administration of justice”----the judges ought, in a well regulated state, to be equally independent of the executive and legislative powers. Thus in England, judges hold their commissions from the crown “during good behavior,” and have salaries, suitable to their dignity, settled on them by parliament. The
