understandings. Yet, for the honour of the profession, I am content to oppose one lawyer to another, especially when it happens that the King's Attorney-General has virtually disclaimed the doctrine by which the Chief Justice meant to insure success to the prosecution. The opinion of the plaintiff's counsel, however it may be otherwise insignificant, is weighty in the scale of the defendant.—My Lord Chief Justice De Grey, who filed the information ex officio, is directly with me. If he had concurred in Lord Mansfield's doctrine, the trial must have been a very short one. The facts were either admitted by Woodfall's counsel, or easily proved to the satisfaction of the jury. But Mr. De Grey, far from thinking he should acquit himself of his duty, by barely proving the facts, entered largely, and, I confess, not without ability, into the demerits of the paper, which he called a seditious libel. He dwelt but lightly upon those points, which, according to Lord Mansfield, were the only matter of consideration to the jury. The criminal intent, the libellous matter, the
