to be directed. But, far from meaning to soften or diminish the force of those terms I have made use of, I now go beyond them, and affirm,
I. That the superior power of bailing for felony, claimed by the court of king's bench, is founded upon the opinion of lawyers, and the practice of the court;—that the assent of the legislature to this power is merely negative, and that it is not supported by any positive provision in any statute whatsoever.—If it be, produce the statute.
II. Admitting that the judges of the court of King's Bench are vested with a discretionary power to examine and judge of circumstances and allegations which a justice of peace is not permitted to consider, I affirm that the judges, in the use and application of that discretionary power, are as strictly bound by the spirit, intent, and meaning, as the justice of peace is by the words of the legislature. Favourable circumstances, alleged before the judge, may justify a doubt, whether the prisoner be guilty or not; and where the guilt is doubtful, a presumption of innocence should in general be admitted. But, when any
