constitution, when he exposes the chief magistrate to the personal hatred or contempt of his subjects. When we speak of the firmness of government, we, mean an uniform system of measures, deliberately adopted, and resolutely maintained by the servants of the crown, not a peevish asperity in the language and behaviour of the sovereign. The government of a weak, irresolute monarch, may be wise, moderate, and firm;—that of an obstinate, capricious prince, on the contrary, may be feeble, undetermined, and relaxed. The reputation of public measures depends upon the minister, who is responsible, not upon the king, whose private opinions are not supposed to have any weight against the advice of his counsel, whose personal authority should therefore never be interposed in public affairs.—This, I believe, is true constitutional doctrine. But for a moment let us suppose it false. Let it be taken for granted, that an occasion may arise in which a king of England shall be compelled to take upon himself the ungrateful office of rejecting the petitions and censuring the conduct of his subjects; and let the City remonstrance be supposed to have created so extraordinary an occasion. On this principle, which I presume no friend of administration will dispute, let the wisdom
