distance from us, where they receive the munificence of the Government in their annuities, on the east of the Red River and the Arkansas. What is the consequence? They believe Texas is not their friend, or that the Federal Government, from their crude notions of it, would pay them in Texas, and would not make them travel over rivers, and through trackless prairies, to receive their presents. They return to Texas, not with feelings of respect for the benefits they receive, but with contempt. This is bad policy. You should distribute your presents to the Texas Indians within the limits of Texas. Her territory is broad enough; her domain is fertile enough; her character is high enough to justify you in doing so. She has done much for herself—more than this Government has ever done for her.
In order to treat with the Indians properly, as I have said, you should take away your troops, except the portion I have stated. The Indians, with the exception of the Osages, Kiowas, and Kaws, are disposed to be friendly, I believe. As to the disaffection of the Sioux, I look on it only as an uprising to resist aggression. They were fired on by artillery and small arms, without provocation, and it is but natural that they should resist. Theirs is not a confederation to assail the whites, but to protect themselves. I justify them in doing it. I am sorry there is a necessity for it; but if I were among them, and they proposed a confederacy to repel cruelty and butchery, I would join them, and he would be a dastard who would not.
When gentlemen speak of a war upon the Indians, have they considered the consequences? You may succeed in killing their women and children, but it is a remarkable fact that you kill but very few of the warriors. Those who march with martial display upon the Indians, find them to-night at one point at dark; they may see the smoke of their fires; and at dawn tomorrow they will be fifty or seventy miles away, with their caravans, and every child and woman, not even a dog being left behind. What army that you could send of three thousand men, or any other number, could effect anything by making war upon the Indians? Why, sir, it would be like the redoubtable exploit of the celebrated King of France, who, "with forty thousand men marched up a hill, and then marched down again." [Laughter.] Yes, sir, that, I predict, would be the history of such a campaign.
To accomplish the object here contemplated, it is proposed to spend $5,000,000. As I have said before, that amount of money would civilize every Indian on the continent, if you sent men of intelligence and capacity among them to do it. I have been delighted with the reports which I have had the opportunity of glancing at, accompanying the annual report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. One from a gentleman who now occupies a seat in the other House [Mr. Whitfield] gratified me exceedingly. I have had the pleasure of seeing him but once since my arrival. I knew him, when a youth, in Tennessee, and he has more than met my expectations, though then they were not indifferent. He has proved himself to be a man of fine perceptions, of excellent judgment, and of good heart. He has capacity to treat with and to reclaim the Indians; and, I doubt not, that he and other gentlemen who could be associated with him, could go to the Indians, with five hundred troops, if you please—not march through the Indian country, but send word to the chiefs; let them know they had a force, and there is not a chief, who has had any relations with the United States, but would
