the new President,” of which he had “no knowledge other than that accessible to every citizen. He spoke only for himself.” His programme, in many points, especially those relating to the veto power and the treasury, thoroughly characteristic of his impressionable and impulsive statesmanship, was this: The executive power should be circumscribed by such limitations and safeguards as would render it no longer dangerous to the public liberties. There should be a constitutional provision limiting the President to a single term. The veto power should be more precisely defined, and be subjected to further limitations; for instance, that a veto might be overruled by a simple majority of all the members of the Senate and the House of Representatives. The power of dismission from office should be restricted, and its exercise be rendered responsible; the President should be bound to communicate fully the grounds and motives of the dismission. The control of the treasury should be confided exclusively to Congress, and the President should no longer have the power of dismissing the Secretary of the Treasury, or other persons having the immediate charge of it. The appointment of members of Congress to any office, or any but a few specific offices, during their continuance in Congress and for one year thereafter, should be prohibited. As to “matters of an administrative nature,” Congress should exert all its power to establish and maintain a currency of stability and uniform value. Whether this were to be done by
