houn, the same man who had declared in 1836 the annexation of Texas necessary, now pretended that, in view of such avowals by Lord Aberdeen, annexation had become immediately indispensable for the salvation of slavery, and, therefore, for the safety of the people of the United States. Tyler's message, which accompanied the treaty, had, indeed, much to say of the commercial advantages which the “reannexation” of Texas would confer upon the American people; but it laid also great stress upon the “anxiety of other powers to induce Mexico to enter into terms of reconciliation with Texas, which, affecting the domestic institutions of Texas, would operate most injuriously upon the United States, and might most seriously threaten the existence of this happy Union.” Nor did he omit to mention that “formidable associations of persons were directing their utmost efforts” to the overthrow of slavery in Texas. In other words, the United States were bound to risk a war and annex a country for fear that slavery might be abolished in that country; the United States must possess that country for the avowed purpose of preserving slavery there. This was the argument of the President and the Secretary of State before the Senate, and this was the position in which they placed the great American Republic before the world.
The Whig National Convention met at Baltimore on May 1. Almost all the notables of the Whig party were there, Webster included. The
