he had only “crude impressions on matters of policy,” in several letters which became public and astonished the politicians. His sponsors among the Whig leaders grew alarmed lest his unguarded utterances should endanger his nomination by a regular Whig party convention. They, therefore, took him in training, and composed a letter for him which should soothe the partisan mind. But they could not make him say more than that he was a Whig, “although not an ultra one;” that “he would not be President of a party,” but “would endeavor to act independent of party domination,” and “untrammeled by party schemes;” that he would not use the veto power “except in cases of clear violation of the Constitution, or manifest haste or want of consideration by Congress;” that, as to the tariff, the currency, and internal improvements, “the will of the people, as expressed through their representatives in Congress, ought to be respected and carried out by the Executive;” and that he was in favor of peace, and opposed “to the subjugation of other nations and the dismemberment of other countries by conquest.” With this the Whig politicians had to be satisfied.
Clay observed this movement in favor of General Taylor with extreme displeasure, which found vent in his letters to his friends. Up to the battle of Buena Vista he thought the Whig masses were determined to stand by him. He insisted that the Whig party had always been committed against mere military officers for the presidency, and that,
