did not openly accept the compromise as they accepted it.
The discussion of the question whether the compromise was to be a finality, had a strong flavor of the absurd, for the very character of the discussion afforded the strongest proof that it was not, and could not be, an irreversible adjustment. Also the effort to unite the Whigs upon the basis of the compromise, made manifest that the party could not be so united. There were in it too many men who had opinions of their own and clung to them. The task of the managers, who had to put the party in array for a presidential campaign, could not have been more perplexing. There seemed to be but one way to hold it together with the least prospect of success, — to find a candidate who possessed the confidence of both wings in a sufficient degree to harmonize them for a common effort. They tried another expedient, with disastrous result. The most prominent aspirants in the field were Daniel Webster and General Scott. By his seventh-of-March speech, and the bitter attacks upon the anti-slavery men which followed, Webster hoped to have won the confidence and support of the South. He also counted upon the active support of the administration, it being understood that Fillmore would under no circumstances himself be a candidate, and that Webster was his favorite. In both respects Webster was disappointed. The South did not trust him. His seventh-of-March speech had generally been looked upon as a change of
