mode of dismissing delinquents from subordinate offices than that of impeachment, which, strictly speaking, was perhaps the only one in the contemplation of the framers of the Constitution.” Neither would the measure he recommended curtail the discretion of the Executive in this respect. He said: —
“By the usage of the government, — not, I think, by the Constitution, — the President possesses the power to dismiss those who are unworthy of holding these offices. By no practice or usage, but that which he himself has created, has he the power to dismiss meritorious officers only because they differ from him in politics. The principal object of the bill is to require the President, in cases of dismission, to communicate the reasons which have induced him to dismiss the officer; in other words, to make an arbitrary and despotic power a responsible power. It is not to be supposed that, if the President is bound publicly to state his reasons, he would act from passion or caprice, or without any reason. He would be ashamed to avow that he discharged the officer because he opposed his election.”
Clay might have said more: a President, or any officer intrusted with the power of removal, would find in such an obligation a most powerful protection against the urgency of those demanding removals, the reasons for which cannot honorably be avowed.
This proposition was vigorously supported by the statesmen whose names stand foremost in the political history of that period; and it is a remark-
