Page:Littell's Living Age - Volume 136.pdf/792

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BENEDICT DE SPINOZA.
783

of conduct by this man whose opinions have been called abominable, execrable, and atheistic? In one word, it is this: to use the world with cheerfulness and content, not abusing it, and remembering that the good of mankind consists in doing good to one another. Here are some of his precepts: —

Nothing is more useful to man than man; men can desire nothing more excellent for their welfare than that all should so agree in all things that the minds and bodies of all should make up as it were one mind and one body, and all together strive to maintain their welfare to the best of their power, and all together seek the common good of all. Therefore reasonable men desire no good for themselves which they do not also desire for other men, and so they are righteous, faithful, and honorable.[1]

Again he says that discontent and melancholy are good for no man: that it is the part of a wise man to use the world and take all reasonable pleasure in it. It is good to refresh oneself not only with moderate food and drink, but with pleasant prospects, music, the theatre, and other things which every man may enjoy without harm to his neighbor.[2] In the same way, though his own life was most quiet and sedentary, he strongly points out the advantage of being many-sided (as we should now say) in both mind and body, and thereby being apt to receive new impressions and put forth new activities.[3] This is one of the points, in which he curiously anticipates modern ideas about development and adaptation to one's environment.

He insists in the strongest terms on the importance of society to man's well-being.

Society is imperfect [he says], but even as it is men get far more good than harm by it. Therefore let satirists laugh at men's affairs as much as they please, let theologians decry them, let misanthropes do their utmost to extol a rude and brutish life; but men will still find that their needs are best satisfied by each other's help, and that the dangers which surround them can be avoided only by joining their strength.[4]

Again he says: —

He who chooses to avenge wrong by returning hatred for it is assuredly miserable. But if a man strives to cast out hatred by love, he fights his fight in all joy and confidence, being able to withstand many foes as easily as one, and having no need to call on fortune for aid. As for those he conquers, they yield to him joyfully, and that not from failing strength, but because they are made stronger.[5]

Again: —

The spirit of men is overcome, not by force of arms, but by love and high-mindedness.[6]

The following maxim contains a lofty refinement of morality, if one may so speak, to which it would be difficult to find a parallel even in Marcus Aurelius: -

If a man wishes to help others by word or deed to the common enjoyment of the highest good, he shall first of all endeavor himself to win their love to him; but not to draw them into admiration of him, that a doctrine may be called after his name, nor in any manner to give cause for offence. Also in common talk he will avoid telling of men's faults, and will speak but sparingly of human weakness. But he will speak largely of mans excellence and power, and the means whereby it may be perfected; so that men may strive to live after the commandment of reason, so far as in them lies, being moved thereto not by fear or disgust, but in pure joyfulness.[7]

The mention of M. Aurelius suggests a parallel which I must note in passing, though I have not room to work it out. There is a singular coincidence between the ethical theory of Spinoza and that of the Stoics: I say coincidence, for Spinoza's slender acquaintance with Greek philosophy precludes the supposition of borrowing. The effort or impulse of self-preservation, which in his system is the mainspring of action, is really involved in the Stoic conception of "following nature." He holds that right action for man lies in the preservation — taken in the largest sense — of mankind not of the individual merely, because, as a matter of fact shown by experience, man is a social animal, and the welfare of the individual can be found only in society. He likewise constantly speaks of a moral life as equivalent to a life which is reasonable or according to reason. Both these positions are thoroughly Stoic. Nor are these the only resemblances.

Spinoza's health had been failing for some years before his death, and he was attacked by consumption, which possibly was aggravated by his work of glass-polishing. The last illness was short and almost sudden. It came on the 21st of February, I677. The day was a Sunday, and in the morning Spinoza had been talking to his hosts, Van der Spyck and his wife, as was his custom. His friend and

  1. Eth. iv. 18, schol.
  2. Ib. 45, schol. 2.
  3. Ib. 38.
  4. Ib. 35, school.
  5. Eth. iv. 46, schol.
  6. Ib. Appendix, cap. 11.
  7. Ib. Appendix, cap. 25.