Page:Logic Taught by Love.djvu/51

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Babbage on Miracle
47

further knowledge of Nature's series. He investigated not only those mathematical series the equations of which are known, and which underlie such natural curves as planet-paths, lines of refraction, &c.; but also those forms of Natural sequence the mathematical expressions of which have not yet been ascertained, such as geologic changes, the development of plants and animals, &c. He had nothing to lose or gain by any conclusion to which he might be led; he had one all-absorbing end in view, the perfecting of his machine; and, for that object, it mattered nothing what the Laws of Nature should turn out to be; the one desideratum was that he, Babbage, should know what they were, and embody them truly in the construction of his cogs and wheels. One of the facts which he discovered was this:—For one series (numerical or phenomenal) which goes on uniformly, there are an almost infinite number which either sooner or later have interruptions or Singular Terms. His arguments cannot be fully entered on here; but the main result is this:—Whoever adduces the inflexibility of Law to prove the improbability of Miracle, only proves that he does not understand the connection between Law and Phenomena. No miracle, Mr. Babbage considers, could be, à priori, so improbable as it is that man should learn the true law of any sequence by observing an uninterrupted series of phenomena. He says:—"It is more probable that any law, at the knowledge of which we have arrived by observation, shall be subject to one of those violations which, according to Hume's definition,[1] constitute a miracle,

  1. Hume had "deduced the à priori probability against the occurrence of miracle from universal experience."