into the practicability of procuring a sufficient number of boats to transport an army of eight or nine thousand men to Amarápura.
'I should hope that though the main enterprise may be relinquished, the possession of Rangoon, Cheduba, and perhaps other ports or islands belonging to the Burmese, may induce them to accede to such terms of peace as we shall propose.
'It is really with considerable hesitation that I have entered into this detail with you. Arrangements like these are far beyond the reach of my experience; and I may have overlooked objections which would readily present themselves to persons more conversant with these matters.
One other set of passages from a letter of April 2, 1824, may serve still further to illustrate Lord Amherst's ideas for the campaign.
'The aid to be derived from the Siamese, in the event of protracted hostilities, has entered deeply into our calculation. But I am not disposed, if we can possibly avoid it, to engage too largely in the intrigues and politics of the Indo-Chinese nations, or to enter into engagements which we are not prepared at all hazards to fulfil. Our main object will be, not the acquisition of new territory, but the security of that which we already possess. . . . The only tribe to which we have yet held out hopes of independence is the Assamese. These were annexed about four years ago to the kingdom of Ava, and it is highly desirable on every account that they should no longer remain subject to the Burmese yoke.'
There were of course other modes of approach to Amarápura. Burmese hosts had passed through the wilderness of mountains to Assam and to Arakan. Why should not a small well-equipped force of
